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Abstract
We consider a statistical decision problem faced by a two player organization
whose members may not agree on outcome evaluations and prior probabilities.
One player is specialized in gathering information and transmitting it to the
other, who takes the decision. This process is modeled as a game. Qualitative
properties of the equilibria are analyzed. The impact of improving the quality
of available information on the equilibrium welfares of the two individuals is
studied. Better information generally may not improve welfare. We give
conditions under which it will.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
When a decision is made by a group rather than an individual, the twin tasks of
acquiring information on the one hand, and choosing a course of action on the other,
are often delegated to separate sets of individuals. If all members of the group share
common evaluations of the outcomes and have identical prior beliefs, then there is no
conﬂict between the information-gatherers and the action-takers. Information will be
accurately transmitted by the former and optimally utilized by the latter.
Here we study the situation that arises when interests do not coincide. When
interests diverge, complete transmission may result in actions that are suboptimal
from the information-gatherers’ point of view. The situation is one of partial conﬂict.
We model it as a game in which each of the two functions is executed by a single
rational individual, neglecting conﬂicts among information-gatherers or among agents
controlling diﬀerent aspects of the group’s action. We examine the Nash equilibria of
the resulting two-person game. In particular, we look at the eﬀect on the expected
utilities of the two players of improvements in the available information.
The two individuals will be called the agent and the principal. Their joint decision
problem is to choose an action, ak, from the set A = {a1,...,a K}. The von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility levels of the two participants depend upon the chosen action and
the realization of the state of nature, θm, from the set Θ = {θ1,...,θM}.T h e s e
utilities can be represented by K × M matrices U =[ ukm]a n dU0 =[ u0
km] for the
principal and the agent respectively, where the elements are the utilities realized if
ak is chosen and θm occurs.
The agent receives an observation which is statistically related to the true state
in Θ, and transmits the observation to the principal. He might not do so truthfully.
There are N possible observations, yn,i nt h es e tY = {y1,...,y N}. Allowing random-
izations, his strategies can be represented by an N × N Markov matrix R =[ rnn0],
2where rnn0 is the probability that yn0 is transmitted given that the actual observation
is yn.
The principal chooses the action ak ∈ A given that the observation yn0 has been
transmitted to him. Again, allowing randomization, his strategy is an N ×K Markov
matrix Z =[ zn0k]w h e r ezn0k is the probability that ak is chosen given that yn0 was
transmitted.1
The statistical relationship between states and observations is called the informa-
tion structure. It is represented by an M × N Markov matrix Λ =[ λmn], where λmn
is the probability that yn is observed if the true state is θm. The interpretation of yn
depends on the prior beliefs of the individual in question. We allow diﬀerent beliefs,
π =( π1,...,πM) ∈ ∆M and π0 =( π0
1,...,π0
M) ∈ ∆M for the principal and agent respec-
tively, where ∆M is the set of all M-dimensional probability vectors. The principal’s
posterior probabilities, given an observation, can be derived from π and Λ by Bayes






,w h e r epP
n ∈ ∆M is his posterior if yn
is observed, for n =1 ,...,N. The probability of observing each yn is also implied by
π and Λ.T h u sw eh a v eadistribution of the posterior which is simply the measure
over ∆M assigning the corresponding weight to each of the pP
n. A similar argument
applies for the agent.






where Π and Π0 denotes the square matrices with the vectors π and π0 on the diagonal
1Whenever possible we will try to follow the convention of labeling typical actions and states
with indices k and m, and the true and transmitted observations with n and n0.
3and zeros elsewhere.2
In this paper we examine the Nash equilibria of this game. A pair of Markov
matrices (Z,R)i saNash equilibrium if Z maximizes (1.1) and R maximizes (1.2).
The main results of the paper can be viewed in the tradition of comparative statics.
We are interested in the consequences of changes in the information structure (Y,Λ)
on the equilibria of the game. Speciﬁcally, it is well-known that a partial ordering
of information structures according to the criterion of informativeness can be given
a precise mathematical characterization. This is an ordering based on single-person
statistical decision theory. An information structure (Y,Λ)i ss a i dt ob emore infor-
mative than (Y 0,Λ0) if, for any U and any π, the decision problem under the former
has at least as high a value as that under the latter. Using the notation developed







where the maximum in each case is taken over all Markov matrices of the appropriate
dimension. Blackwell (1951) has shown the following:
Λ is more informative than Λ0 if and only if
there exists a Markov matrix B such that Λ0 = ΛB.
We want to study the relation between this condition and conditions suﬃcient
for the improvement of the welfare of one or both of the players in our two-person
organization. Because of the compounding of game theoretic aspects with the usual














and a similar expression holds for the agent. The interpretation is straightforward. We simply
sum up all the ways in which each action could occur given each possible state, by multiplying the
conditional probabilities of observations given states, transmissions given observations, and actions
given observations, and weighting by the prior probabilities.
4decision theoretic issues, the welfare of the two players may not be monotonic with
respect to the quality of the information structure. Several types of complication
arise.
First, as in most games, there may be multiple equilibria. We have found it hard to
analyze all of them. However, a natural classiﬁcation of equilibria can be given, and
o n et y p e ,w h i c hw ec a l lpartition equilibria, have a rather regular behavior. More-
over, we will give some arguments to the eﬀect that these equilibria have desirable
properties, and are hence “more likely” to be observed.
Second, as in the case of general equilibrium theory, the set of equilibria is lower
hemi-continuous with respect to changes in the parameters. Comparative static re-
sults therefore tend to be only local. Hence we focus on “small” improvements in the
information structure, suitably deﬁned.
Third, and ﬁnally, the comparative static results turn out to be diﬀerent for the
two players. For the agent, any small improvement in the information structure will
improve his expected utility in a partition equilibrium. For the principal this may
not be the case. His welfare can be guaranteed to be monotonic only when a very
special kind of improvement in information is considered.
We deﬁne a success-enhancing improvement in information as one in which the
probability that the observation is uninformative decreases, with a corresponding
equiproportional increase in the probabilities of each of the other observations. If in
the original information structure there is no such observation, that is if the poste-
rior is unequal to the prior for every possible observation, then no success-enhancing
improvements are possible. We show that small success-enhancing improvements in
information necessarily improve the welfare of the principal at any partition equilib-
rium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 covers the classiﬁcation of types of equilibria and presents some genericity
5and stability-like arguments to bolster the case for considering partition equilibria.
Section 3 contains the main comparative static results mentioned above.
Section 4 contains several examples, primarily designed to illustrate directions in
which our results cannot be extended.
II. TYPES OF EQUILIBRIA AND THEIR PROPERTIES
A. Basic Classiﬁcation
We begin by examining some general features of the set of equilibria. First we need
the following deﬁnition.
We will call an M × N0 information structure Λ0 a partition of Λ if Λ0 = ΛPDP0,
where P and P0 are permutation matrices and D is an N ×N0 block diagonal Markov
matrix in which each block has rank one. When Λ0 has this form, it is as if there is
a partition of the signal space Y . Under Λ0, if signal value yk occurs, the partition
element containing yk is reported. Thus P rearranges signal values so that those in a
common partition element are clustered together; each block along the diagonal of D
corresponds to the report for one partition element; and P 0 rearranges the new signal
values in any arbitrary way.
Of prime importance in our later analysis are equilibria in which ΛR, the infor-
mation the agent transmits, is a partition of Λ, the information he receives. These
will be called partition equilibria. In addition there are two types of non-partition
equilibria, distinguished by whether the principal uses pure or mixed strategies. It is
useful to begin with an example that illustrates all three types.
Example 1: There are two states, two actions, and two observations: K = M =
N =2 , and











, π = π
0 =( 1 /2,1/2).
6The agent knows the true state. Both parties prefer action a2 in state θ2. The principal
strictly prefers action a1 in state θ1, but the agent is indiﬀerent between the two
actions.
One equilibrium of this game is the pair of strategies Z = I, R = I.S i n c et h ei n -
formation transmitted by the agent is a partition (the complete reﬁnement partition)
of the space of observations, this is an example of a partition equilibrium.
Another equilibrium is one involving no transmission of information. This equilib-








 α 1 − α
α 1 − α

, α ∈ [0,1].
Note that for any α,R Z= Z. Clearly Λ0 = ΛR is a partition of Λ (the partition
consisting of one set, equal to the whole space), so that this is another example of a
partition equilibrium.
Another type of equilibrium is the pair
Z = I, R =

 1 − εε
01

, 0 < ε ≤ 1/2.
Since Λ0 = ΛR is not a partition of Λ, this is not a partition equilibrium. Because the
principal uses two distinct, nonrandomized actions, we call this a determinate action
equilibrium. Note that randomization by the agent occurs only because in state θ2 he
is indiﬀerent between the two actions a1 and a2. Clearly this situation is non-generic.











, δ ∈ (0,1).
As in the previous case, Λ0 = ΛR is not a partition of Λ. However, in contrast to
the previous case, the principal is playing a mixed strategy. We call this a random
7action equilibrium. All equilibria of this form are non-robust to perturbations in U0.
As long as Z has distinct rows the agent will not remain indiﬀerent between actions,
following a perturbation of U. In this sense, these equilibria are non-robust for the
same reason as the previous type. However, in more general models the determinate
action equilibria, with non-randomized actions by the principal in all cases, is always
non-robust, whereas the random action equilibria may behave continuously in the
parameters. These diﬀerences are explored more fully below.
Returning to the equilibria with both players randomizing, we note that they are
all unstable in the sense that the agent has many optimal responses to Z,n a m e l ya l l
R of the form
R =

 α 1 − α
01

, α ∈ [0,1],
and the principal has many optimal responses to R,n a m e l ya l lZ of the form given
above. But if the principal misperceives R even slightly, his optimal response is a
non-randomized strategy, a Z matrix composed of zeros and ones, and the outcome
would depart markedly from the equilibrium outcome.
B. Robustness of Partition Equilibria
In the rest of this section we will deﬁne partition, determinate action, and random
action equilibria precisely, and argue that partition equilibria are robust in ways that
the others are not. Speciﬁcally, we will show that determinate action equilibria are
non-generic, and that random action equilibria are unstable against small perturba-
tions in either player’s strategy.
Formally we will say that an equilibrium pair (Z,R)i sapartition equilibrium if
Λ0 = ΛR is a partition of Λ;adeterminate action equilibrium if Λ0 = ΛR is not a
partition of Λ,a n de a c hr o wo fZ receiving positive weight under R has only a single
positive element; a random action equilibrium if Λ0 = ΛR is not a partition of Λ,a n d
8some row of Z receiving positive weight under R has two or more nonzero entries.
Roughly speaking, we are presenting a “structural stability” argument to eliminate
determinate action equilibria from consideration and a “dynamic stability” argument
to eliminate random action equilibria. Of course, since we do not present any ad-
justment process, we do not actually have any dynamics. The objection to random
action equilibria is only meant to be suggestive. Nevertheless, partition equilibria will
generically pass both of these tests.
Theorem 2.1: The set of all (U0,Λ) for which there is any determinate action
equilibrium is closed and null.
Proof: The existence of a determinate action equilibrium requires that for some
observation the agent is indiﬀerent among some of the actions in A. It therefore
suﬃces to show that the set of (U0,Λ) for which this indiﬀerence holds is closed and
null. But this property is obvious: unless two rows of U0 are identical (i.e. two actions
a r er e a l l yt h es a m e )t h es e to fp o s t e r i o rp r o b a b i l i t i e su n d e rw h i c ht h e r ei sm o r et h a n
one optimal action is of lower dimensions than ∆M. Hence the set of all Λ matrices
for which these posteriors arise is null. Closedness is obvious. ¥
Theorem 2.2: Let (Z,R) be a random action equilibrium. Then generically in
(U,U0,Λ) there exists a sequence of Markov matrices {Rν} converging to R, such that
i)e a c hRν is an optimal response by the agent to Z;
ii) the set of optimal responses by the principal to each Rν is bounded away from
Z.
Proof: Since (Z,R) is a random action equilibrium there exists yn ∈ Y and n1,
n2 such that
a) rnn1 > 0,r nn2 > 0,n 1 6= n2;
b) the row vectors zn1· and zn2· are distinct; and
c) the row vector zn1· has at least two positive entries.
9Since R is an optimal response to Z, it remains an optimal response if rnn1 is increased
by ν and rnn2 is decreased by ν.L e tRν be the matrix with this change. Generically
in Λ, this change in the agent’s strategy alters the principal’s posterior beliefs when
the signal yn1 is transmitted. Generically in U, this change in his posterior beliefs
destroys the equality of the expected utilities under the actions represented in the
mixture in the nst
1 row of Z.H e n c e Z is not a best response to Rν. Letting ν → 0
establishes the claim. ¥
Theorem 2.3: Generically in (U,U0,Λ), if (Z,R) is a partition equilibrium, then,
i) every row of Z for which the corresponding column of R has a positive entry
is uniquely determined in the optimal response to R;
ii) R is the unique optimal response to Z and is itself a partition.
Proof: Obvious. ¥
The main comparative static results of this paper apply to the generic instance of
partition equilibria with the properties stated in Theorem 2.3. To delineate this class
of equilibria more sharply, we give the following deﬁnition.
A partition equilibrium (Z,R) is called an essential equilibrium if the following two
conditions hold:
i)i fZ0 is an optimal response to R then RZ0 = RZ;
ii)i fR0 is an optimal response to Z then R0Z = RZ.
The idea of essential equilibria is that the strategies of each player are “essentially”
unique, in the sense that choosing a diﬀerent strategy from the optimal set does not
alter the statistical relationship between the observations and the action taken. An
essential equilibrium remains an equilibrium when either player chooses a diﬀerent
element in his set of optimal responses. Essential equilibria also possess a kind of
“stability” in that they are robust to small deviations from optimal responses.
The distinction between partition equilibria in general and essential equilibria can
10be seen in the following example, to which we will return in Section 3.




π =( 0 .4,0.6), π







Consider Z = R = I. It is straightforward to verify that this is a partition equilibrium.












































Therefore, the agent is indiﬀerent between both actions when he receives the obser-
vation y2, and the principal is indiﬀerent when the agent transmits y1.T h ec h o i c e s
of Z = R = I are mutually fortuitous, and neither requirement in the deﬁnition of an
essential equilibrium holds. The non-genericity of non-essential partition equilibria is
responsible for their peculiar comparative static properties, as we will see below.
III. IMPROVEMENTS IN THE INFORMATION STRUCTURE
In this section we present the main comparative static results of this paper. We ask
the question: When can one be sure, independent of a knowledge of the preferences
and beliefs of the two individuals, that one information structure is better than an-
other in the sense of providing a higher level of expected utility in equilibrium? The
answer depends on whose welfare is being considered. Broadly speaking we ﬁnd that
11the agent beneﬁts from any improvement in the information structure. The princi-
pal, however, can well be hurt. Only for one very special, though interesting, type of
improvement can we be sure that the principal beneﬁts.
One further qualiﬁcation is important to emphasize. As in many games, and as we
have seen in the examples of Section 2, there are often multiple equilibria. Because
they can be regarded as ﬁxed points of a suitable mapping, they are continuous in the
parameters of the problems for almost all parameter values. However, at some critical
points the set of equilibria changes radically. Non-essential partition equilibria, for
example, are likely to occur at such points.
For this reason our results are “local” in nature. We deﬁne a concept of “small”
changes in the information structure. The comparative static results described above
apply to changes in information that are suﬃciently small, at an equilibrium that
moves continuously in this change.
The concept of small changes or, mathematically, a topology on the space of
information structure, is given by the following deﬁnition of convergence. It is
natural to say that a sequence of information structures {Λν} converges to Λ0 if
for any decision maker with utility matrix U and prior π,t h es e q u e n c eo fv a l -
ues {V (U,π,Λν)=m a x D∈M trUΠΛνD} converges to V (U,π,Λ0). Obviously this is
equivalent to the weak convergence of the distribution of the posteriors for any strictly
positive prior. Information structures representing a small improvement in informa-
tion from Λ0 are those in a neighborhood of Λ0 which are also more informative in
the sense of Blackwell.
It is important to point out that the dimensionality of the likelihood matrices, that
is to say the number of possible observations Nν, is not held constant. We are able
to compare information structures in which the qualitative nature of the signals are
quite diﬀerent.
We will now show that essential equilibria have an invariance property that is
12responsible for the comparative static results that we will obtain.
Theorem 3.1: Let {Λυ} be a sequence of information structures converging to Λ0,
and let (Z0,R 0) be an essential equilibrium for Λ0. There exists a sequence {(Zυ,R υ)}
of equilibria corresponding to {Λυ} with the property that {ΛυRυ} converges to Λ0R0.
Proof: The proof is by construction of a sequence {(Zυ,R υ)} having the required
properties.
For each ak ∈ A,l e tBk ⊆ ∆M be the set of posterior beliefs for which the principal
strictly prefers ak to the other actions in A. Note that these sets are disjoint. Since
(Z0,R 0) is essential, the principal’s posterior given any signal from Λ0R0 lies in the
interior of one of the sets Bk.
Let A0 ⊆ A be the subset of actions receiving positive weight under Z0, and for
each ak ∈ A0,l e tCk ⊆ ∆M be the set of posterior beliefs for which the agent strictly
prefers ak to the other actions in A0.S i n c e( Z0,R 0) is essential, the agent’s posterior
given any signal from Λ0 lies in the interior of one of the sets Ck.
Let ˆ Z be any matrix of appropriate dimension whose distinct rows are precisely
the distinct rows of Z0 receiving positive weight under R0. Select a subset J of these
rows containing all the distinct rows of ˆ Z and no duplicates. Let Rυ be any response
to ˆ Z that is optimal for the agent, given the information structure Λυ and subject to
the constraint that only signals in J are transmitted. By construction Rν is also an
unconstrained optimal response for the agent, given Λν and ˆ Z.
Since {Λυ} converges to Λ0,a sυ →∞ , with probability approaching one the
agent’s posteriors given the signals in Λυ lie in the interiors of the same sets Ck as
they do under Λ0. Hence {ΛυRυ} converges to Λ0R0.
Finally, note that by construction the number of distinct signals transmitted under
ΛυRυ is the same as the number transmitted under Λ0R0. Hence for υ suﬃciently
large the principal’s posterior under any signal from ΛυRυ lies the interior of the set
Bk corresponding to the action selected by ΛυRυ ˆ Z.H e n c e Zυ = ˆ Z is an optimal
13response for the principal, and the sequence {(Zυ,R υ)} has the required properties.
¥
Theorem 3.2: Let (Z0,R 0) be an essential equilibrium for the information struc-
ture Λ0.L e t{Λυ} be a sequence of information structures, each element of which is
more informative than Λ0 (in the sense of Blackwell), and such that {Λυ} converges
to Λ0.L e t{(Zυ,R υ)} be the sequence of equilibria whose existence is established in
Theorem 3.1. Then, for υ suﬃciently large, the agent is better oﬀ under Λυ with the
equilibrium (Zυ,R υ) than under Λυ with the equilibrium (Z0,R 0).
Proof: As the rows of Zυ are precisely the distinct rows of Z0,b yc o n s t r u c t i o n
the agent is facing a ﬁxed decision problem and hence his welfare cannot diminish
under any improvement in the sense of Blackwell. ¥
The next example illustrates the role of the hypothesis that the equilibrium is
essential.
Example 3: There are four actions, four states, and three or four signals, K =
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0 <a<b , 0 <c<d , 0 <e .
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States θ1 and θ4 are perfectly revealed under both information structures. The more
informative system Λε is useful only in distinguishing state θ2 from θ3.
Under Λ0 the posteriors are
p10 =( 1 ,0,0,0),p 20 =( 0 ,1/2,1/2,0),p 30 =( 0 ,0,0,1),
so both the principal and the agent are indiﬀerent among the actions {a1,a 2,a 3} if
y2 is observed: each is a fair bet. Thus,













is a partition equilibrium. The agent accurately reports the observation, and the
principal chooses an if yn is reported, for n =1 ,2,3. The principal’s expected utility
is 1/2 and the agent’s is 0.
This equilibrium is not essential, however. The principal is indiﬀerent between ˆ Z
















There is another partition equilibrium under Λ0, the no communication equilibrium.
The principal uses the strategy Z0 and the agent uses any Markov matrix R0 with
rank one. The principal’s expected utility is again 1/2, but the agent’s is −e. This
15equilibrium is essential: RZ0 = R0Z0 for any Markov matrix R, so the agent cannot
aﬀect the outcome; and the principal’s best response to R0 is unique.
For ε > 0,the only equilibrium is the no communication equilibrium. The principal
uses the strategy Zε that puts probability one on a4 in response to any report, and
the agent uses any Markov matrix Rε with rank one. The principal’s expected utility
is again 1/2 and the agent’s is −e.
To see why there are no other equilibria note that the posteriors under Λε are
p1ε =( 1 ,0,0,0),p 2ε =( 0 , (1 + ε)/2, (1 − ε)/2,0),
p4ε =( 0 ,0,0,1),p 3ε =( 0 , (1 − ε)/2, (1 + ε)/2,0).
Thus, the agent strictly prefers a1 to a2 if y2 is observed, and strictly prefers a3 to a2
if y3 is observed: the former involves increasing the size of a favorable gamble, and the
latter involves comparing an unfavorable gamble with one that is favorable. Suppose
the principal were to use the strategy of playing a1 if y1 is reported, a2 if y2 or y3 is
reported, and a3 if y4 is reported, which under Λε and accurate reporting is the analog
of ˆ Z. The agent would never report y2 or y3. Instead he would report y1 or y4, which
gives him an expected utility of dε/2 instead of the 0 he gets by reporting accurately.
This would reduce the principal’s expected utility, however, and since the principal
can always guarantee himself an expected utility of 1/2 by ignoring the reports and
taking the action a4, he would do so. Therefore, the analog of the
³
ˆ R, ˆ Z
´
equilibrium
does not exist for ε > 0, and a sequence of the type described in Theorem 3.1 does
not exist.
We now consider the principal’s welfare. Further conditions are required to guar-
antee that better information raises the principal’s equilibrium expected utility. A
modiﬁcation of Example 2 is useful in gaining insights to the results.
Example 4: As in Example 2, K = M =2 , and for Λ0 the number of distinct




 .6 − ευ 2ευ .4 − ευ
.4 − ευ 2ευ .6 − ευ

,








Moreover {Λυ} is a sequence of improvements, in the sense of Blackwell. We modify
the priors so they are slightly more diﬀuse:
π =( 0 .45,0.55), π
0 =( 0 .55,0.45).
The other data of the example are unchanged, U = U0 = I.L e ty1 and y2 denote the
signals under Λ0, and y1,y2,y3 denote those under Λν.
Under Λ0 it is straightforward to verify that Z = R = I is an essential partition
equilibrium. It results in an expected utility of 0.6 to each player.
For εν suﬃciently small, the game with information structure Λν has an essentially
unique partition equilibrium (other than the no-transmission equilibrium). The agent
transmits the partition {y1,y2},{y3}, and in response the principal chooses a1 and
a2 respectively. Thus action a1 is taken when y2 is observed, as the agent prefers. The
expected utilities at this equilibrium are 0.6 − εν and 0.6+εν for the principal and
the agent respectively. Although the principal would rather have the agent transmit
the partition {y1},{y2,y3}, there is nothing he can do to enforce this. Complete
communication is not an equilibrium because the principal would choose a2 after y2,
making complete communication irrational for the agent. In this example the better
information structure entails a positive probability of a signal that causes the two
players to disagree. The principal loses because at equilibrium the information is
used by the agent in a way opposite to what the principal would like.
17Our positive comparative static results rely on a condition that we will call success-
enhancing.
The motivation for examining success enhancing improvements is that there are
many situations where one hopes to receive an informative observation but in fact
nothing happens. Either the experiment “fails” or the outcome is not available soon
enough to be useful in making the decision. Since many improvements in information
reduce the failure rate or cut the average delay time without aﬀecting the quality
of the experimental procedure itself, these results are of considerable interest. The
formal deﬁnition is as follows.

















where α ≥ 0, Γ is an M × (N − 1) Markov matrix, and no two columns of Γ are
proportional to each other.
The ﬁrst signal of an information structure in standard form represents the totally
uninformative observation: “dropping the test tube.” A success-enhancing improve-
ment lowers the probability of this observation and raises all others proportionately.



































0 ≤ α < α
0 ≤ 1, and P is a permutation matrix.
























Finally, a small success-enhancing improvement is one in which α0 and α are close.
Whenever Λ is a success-enhancing improvement of Λ0 we can reorder the columns
of Λ0 so that the permutation matrix P referred to in the above deﬁnition is the
i d e n t i t y .F o rt h er e s to ft h i ss e c t i o nw ew i l ls u p p o s et h a tt h i si st h ec a s e ,a st h i si n
no way changes the structure of the game. With this normalization we can write
Λ
0 = ΛD,







, for n =2 ,...,N. (3.1)
We will make use of this representation in the proof of the main theorem, which
follows.
Theorem 3.3: Let (Z,R) be an essential equilibrium for Λ0 and let Λ be a small
success-enhancing improvement of Λ0. Then (Z,R) remains an equilibrium for Λ and
the principal’s expected utility cannot decrease.
Proof: That (Z,R) remains an equilibrium follows from an argument parallel
to that used in the proof of Theorem 3.1 The assertion that the principal’s expected
utility cannot decrease will be proven using the special structure of success-enhancing
improvements. We will express Λ0 and Λ in standard form and note that Λ0 = ΛD,
where the elements of D are given by (3.1). The principal’s expected utility under Λ
is tr UΠΛRZ and under Λ0 it is tr UΠΛDRZ. Thus, the gain in going from Λ0 to Λ is
∆ =t rRZUΠΛ(I − D). (3.2)
19This quantity will be proven to be necessarily non-negative.
Using (3.1) we see that






































Since Λ is in standard form its ﬁrst column is the constant α, and we have
ΛC = αJ, (3.4)

























[trUΠΛRZ − trUΠJRZ], (3.5)
where the second line uses the commutativity of matrix multiplication under the
trace. The two terms in brackets in (3.5) have straightforward interpretations. The
20ﬁrst is the equilibrium expected value of the principal under the better information
structure. The second is the expected utility he would obtain if he used the action
matrix Z in a decision problem with information structure JR. But this information
structure is totally uninformative: it is an M × N Markov matrix that contains the
ﬁrst row of R repeated M times. Therefore the second term in brackets is at most
the expected value the principal could obtain by optimizing in a situation where
no information is available. This cannot exceed the ﬁrst term, so the expression in
brackets is nonnegative. Since α0 − α ≥ 0, it follows that ∆ ≥ 0.
We note that ∆ is zero only if the principal is indiﬀerent, in equilibrium, between Z
and a rank one matrix composed of a repeated row. Otherwise ∆ is strictly positive.
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IV. COMMENTS AND FURTHER EXAMPLES
In this section we gather a few comments showing why the results above cannot
be strengthened and addressing some conjectures about the qualitative nature of the
Nash equilibria.
1. Success-enhancing improvements in information have the property that the set
of posterior beliefs that can arise after seeing the observation remains ﬁxed. One
might imagine that this property alone is responsible for the beneﬁcial nature of the
change.
An improvement in information from Λ0 to Λ can be called posterior-preserving if
Λ0 = ΛD, where D is a diagonal matrix, and Λ0 = ΛB, where B is a Markov matrix.
Note that a non-informative signal may not exist. If (Z,R) is an equilibrium for the
information structure Λ0, then we know that R is among the agent’s best responses
to Z under Λ. The following example shows, however, that the principal’s welfare
may decrease if he plays Z and, moreover, that there may be no possibility for him
to achieve the former level of utility.



























It is easy to see that Λ is a posterior-preserving improvement of Λ0. The ﬁrst three
signals in either case are perfect predictors of the state, while the fourth carries some
information but does not limit the set of states that are possible.





















































constitute an equilibrium. In it expected utility for the principal is .2 under Λ0 but
.1 under Λ. More information has therefore been harmful.
Notice that even thoughΛ is strictly more informative that Λ0, ΛR is non-comparable
to Λ0R. For this particular utility function it is worse.
2. Even if the improvement in information is success enhancing, a discrete change
from Λ0 to Λ may be such that (Z,R) is no longer an equilibrium. R remains a best
response to Z, but Z may not be best against R.
An example, available from the authors on request, shows that all the equilibria
under Λ may be inferior for the principal to a given partition equilibrium for Λ0.
Theorem 3.3 relies on the changes being small enough so that (Z,R)p e r s i s t sa sa n
equilibrium.
223. We investigated the conjecture that the common reﬁnement of the partitions im-
plicit in two partition equilibria always corresponds to another partition equilibrium.
A counterexample to this conjecture is also available on request.
4. Recent work by Crawford and Sobel (1982) shows that some further generality
can be attained in our results if a smaller set of decision problems is considered.
Speciﬁcally, they show that improved information always beneﬁts the principal if
utilities are concave in actions and states and both the state space and the signal
space are one dimensional. Moreover, in that situation there are no equilibria other
than partition equilibria.
5. Finally, it should be emphasized that the main results of this paper are crucially
dependent on the ﬁniteness of the set of possible actions. These results are local in
nature, as noted above in point (2). The structure of our model is such that within a
neighborhood of a given information structure, partition equilibria are locally constant
with respect to success-enhancing or posterior preserving improvements. This enables
us to evaluate welfare changes by examining the eﬀect of the improved information
in a ﬁxed equilibrium.
If there were a continuum of actions the neighborhood of local constancy might
vanish. Changing information would induce locally continuous shifts in the equilibria.
Welfare eﬀects would then depend upon the nature of these shifts, as well as on the
diﬀerence in the quality of the information.
Andrew Postlewaite (1980) has provided us with an example of a game with a
unique partition equilibrium in which the principal’s welfare declines, for this reason,
in response to a success-enhancing improvement in the agent’s information.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have examined a simple two-person game designed to represent the separation
of functions in an organization. It has been argued that although this game may have
23multiple equilibria, there is one type of particular note. In analyzing the comparative
statics of individual welfare with respect to improvements in information, we have
concentrated on this type of equilibrium.
In general, improvements in information may be harmful for one or even both
players. We therefore tried to ﬁnd restrictions on the nature of the improvement in
information that imply that it is surely beneﬁcial.
For large shifts in the information structure, nothing can be said, in general. Lo-
cally, an arbitrary improvement in the information structure will generically beneﬁt
the agent, but the principal may be hurt. To guarantee that neither player is hurt by
a small improvement in information, the change must be “success-enhancing.” That
is, it must represent a decrease in the probability of receiving an uninformative obser-
vation and, correspondingly, proportional increases in the probabilities of receiving
all other observations.
There are many possible extension of this model. We will mention only two of them
here.
Our analysis concentrated on restricting the information structure. An alternative
is to look for restrictions on utilities and priors. In this regard the paper by Crawford
and Sobel (1982) cited above is relevant.
Our model is related to, but distinct from, the principal-agent problem that has
been widely discussed in the literature. There the agent plays the role of both informa-
tion gatherer and decision maker. The principal is present only to help oﬀset risks by
making contingent payments of a transferable resource. We have no such resource, the
essential feature of our model resting in the separation of the information-gathering
and decision-making functions within the organization. The possibility of making
such conditional payments would add an entirely new dimension to the analysis. The
principal might, for example, set up a payment schedule that would coax a more
accurate transmission out of the agent. Paralleling the principal-agent literature, it
24is probably best to model this as the Stackelberg, rather than Nash, equilibrium of a
game in which the principal is the leader. We begin the study of this solution concept
in a companion paper, Green and Stokey (1981), retaining the structure presented
here in all other respects–including the absence of transferable utility.
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